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Abstract 
The term "rules of origin" is an economic expression referring 
to a set of substantive rules for identifying the source of imported 
goods. As with any set of rules, certain formalities must be followed 
which entail public and private transaction costs. The public sector has 
to enforce the rules of origin and implement proper controls with a 
view to monitoring external trade in goods, minimizing budgetary 
expenditures and maximizing the collection of tax revenues, while at 
the same time facilitating international trade. Likewise, private agents 
involved in external trade in goods are required to follow certain 
procedures, which should be efficient and expeditious. 
There is already an abundance of economic literature relating to 
rules of origin; in this paper, we are concerned with the procedures 
involved in complying with such rules, in both the public and the 
private spheres. We approach the issue from the standpoint of trade 
facilitation. The matter of determining the origin of internationally 
traded goods inevitably comes up, however, so it will be discussed, 
although not in depth. Although there is no single definition of the 
term "trade facilitation", all working definitions take into account the 
matter of customs procedures, and many also explicitly refer to rules 
of origin. In both cases, the idea is to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with internationally traded goods. 
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I.  General Features of Rules of 
Origin 
A.  The Concept of Rules of Origin 
Conceptually, rules of origin are a set of requirements that must 
be met by a final good1 in terms of the inputs and intermediate goods 
used in its production, in order to define the nationality of the product, 
in the case of an individual country, or of a geographic territory, in the 
case of a group of countries. Identifying the origin of a product is 
important from the standpoint of statistics, technical production issues, 
economic factors and international trade. The main reason for having 
such rules, however, is to determine whether the merchandise in 
question is eligible for tariff preferences granted by the importing 
country. 
Rules of origin may be preferential or non-preferential. 
Preferential rules are applied in the context of a selective trade 
arrangement in which favourable treatment is accorded to only or 
more or all of the members. Preferential rules of origin may be 
contractual or autonomous (INFOCENTREX, 2002). Contractual rules 
are those that are applied under an EIA. Autonomous rules are those 
that are established in the context of international programmes, such 
as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) applied by some 
industrialized countries to imports from developing countries.2 They 
                                                     
1  For a history of rules of origin, see Kingston (1994, p. 7). 
2  For a summary of GSP rules of origin, see UNCTAD (1999). To review some national studies relating to GSP, see UNCTAD (2000) 
(USA); UNCTAD (2001) (Canada); and UNCTAD (2002) (Japan). 
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may be applied by a single country or a group of countries. Thus, the United States applies the 
Andean Tariff Preferences Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, while the European Union 
applies the Lomé Agreement, now known as the Cotonou Agreement, in Africa-Caribbean-Pacific 
(ACP) countries. Finally, non-preferential agreements are applied to international trade conducted 
outside the scope of any agreement granting tariff or non-tariff privileges. These fall mainly within 
the legal scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO), given its multilateral structure. 
B. Basic Principles of Rules of Origin 
It is generally agreed that in order to ensure efficiency in their application, rules of origin 
should fulfil the following basic principles: 
1. Simplicity. Rules of origin should be clear and transparent, in order to minimize the 
potential for subjective-interpretative or fraudulent application. 
2. Predictability. Rules of origin should be consistent in order to allow the production 
sector to anticipate the situation and plan their international operations strategically. 
3. Manageability. The rules should be such that they can be managed efficiently, and they 
should allow for simple and expeditious verification procedures by a modern public administration. 
C. Rules of Origin at the Global Level 
Although the importance of rules of origin has been increasingly recognized, no 
internationally agreed definition has yet been reached on how to determine the origin of a given 
merchandise. The first international instrument to address this issue is the International Convention 
on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, which was originally drawn up 
by the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) on 18 May 1973 and entered into force on 25 
September 1974. Three of the annexes to this Convention, better known as the Kyoto Convention, 
deal with rules of origin. Nevertheless, the CCC rules are not binding. The Kyoto Convention 
establishes two criteria for defining origin, as follows: 
1. When the merchandise is "wholly produced" in a given territory. 
2. If that is not the case, and inputs from other origins have been used, in order for a good to 
be identified with the place of manufacture, it must have undergone "substantial transformation". 
This definition is usually – but not exclusively – supplemented with the following three 
fundamental criteria or methods:3 
a) Change of heading or nomenclature. This applies when the end product falls under a 
tariff heading other than the headings applicable to each of the imported intermediate goods used in 
its manufacture;  
b) List of manufacturing or processing operations. This method is usually applied by 
using general lists describing, for each product, the technical manufacturing or processing 
operations regarded as sufficiently important (" qualifying processes "); and 
c) Ad valorem percentage rule. In order to determine origin by this method, the 
minimum domestic value added of a product is determined as a percentage of its total cost or final 
market price. 
                                                     
3  For a discussion of the limitations of these criteria, see Gitli (1995). 
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The Customs Co-operation Council, created in 1952, is now the World Customs 
Organization (WCO). The Kyoto Convention was recently amended by the Protocol of Amendment 
to the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, 
done at Brussels on 26 June 1999. The new rule, which has not yet entered into force, brings the 
previous Convention up to date in the light of major changes that have taken place on the world 
scene. 
The WTO Rules of Origin Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round, which 
formally ended on 15 April 1994. The purpose of the Agreement is to "harmonize and clarify rules 
of origin" relating to non-preferential trade and hence leaving out Article XXIV of GATT 1947,4 
which would cover EIAs. Two committees are established to implement the programme of work, 
namely, the Committee on Rules of Origin, made up of WTO Members, and the Technical 
Committee on Rules of Origin, under the auspices of the Customs Co-operation Council. A great 
deal of work has been carried out under the WTO Agreement, but the tasks outlined at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference of WTO, which were scheduled for completion by December 2001, have 
not yet been concluded.  
Consequently, the joint efforts of WTO and CCC should pave the way for the 
recommendations of CCC to be adopted as binding multilateral arrangements. This could also be 
the case with the nearly 30 recommendations on trade facilitation developed in the context of 
UNECE, which in 1961 created a working group on simplification of trade documentation with a 
view to expediting external transactions, a task which is still ongoing (Izam, 2001, p. 11). The 
recommendations are based on a system developed by the United Nations for electronic exchange 
of data on business, trade and international transport, i.e., the Centre for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT). Recommendation No. 18 deals with rules of origin.5 
All the above notwithstanding, however, WTO is not likely to make much progress in this 
regard over the short term. Since each economy has its own particular circumstances and sensitive 
areas, rules of origin will probably be established at the discretion of the parties concerned, rather 
than multilaterally, for some time to come. National rules and those established by specific EIAs 
will continue to be applied. 
D.  The Main Features of Rules of Origin 
Within the broad range of concepts and issues covered by rules of origin, the following 
features stand out: 
1. Definition of rules of origin. Rules of origin are a set of rules establishing requirements 
that must be met in order for a product to be considered as originating in a given country or region. 
2. Implementation of rules of origin. This term refers to the administrative procedures 
associated with rules of origin, and may be subdivided as follows: 
a) Certification of origin. The documentary procedures to be followed in order to 
establish that a merchandise meets the requirements set forth in a rule of origin. 
b) Proof of origin. Establishing the form and accuracy of the certificate of origin, 
including economic and legal implications of forgery or fraud. 
                                                     
4  Nevertheless, reference is made to rules of origin for preferential trade and the need for EIAs to keep WTO informed of their rules of 
origin. This probably represents a first step for future consideration of such rules. 
5  In this regard, we suggest a review of the following documents: UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of which refer to the 
most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
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The definition of rules of origin has financial implications which have to do with prices and 
the allocation of productive resources, all of which has been fully discussed in the specialized 
literature.6 Some authors argue that rules of origin are discriminatory and are used as a mechanism 
for exclusion (Gutiérrez-Haces, 1998) and that they have an asymmetrical effect (Hirsch, 1998, p. 
41). It seems hard to deny or refute those arguments (Falvey and Reed, 1998). Nevertheless, other 
authors have also pointed out that social wellbeing is maximized to the extent that rules of origin 
differentiate between sectors or products. This may be the case with certain categories of products 
in which there are economies of scale or externalities, that involve the use of state-of-the-art 
technologies or that are labour intensive. Rules of origin may be part of an economic policy aimed 
at diversifying the vertical and horizontal structure of industrial production in a given country or 
region or at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). 
As regards the two aspects of implementation of rules of origin, they also have economic 
implications for trade facilitation, since they have to do with transaction costs in both the private 
and the public sectors. The overall efficiency of a system of rules of origin also depends on 
oversight and administrative procedures being as simple as possible, i.e., on reducing the number of 
steps required of commercial agents, and on the efficiency of the institutions concerned, including 
the customs system. This applies to the certification of origin to verify accuracy in content and in 
form, and to the expeditious settlement of economic or legal disputes, when there is suspicion of 
questionable activity or fraud. All these aspects must be considered before any conclusion can be 
drawn as to the overall economic efficiency of a given system of rules of origin. Consequently, if 
rules are to be properly implemented, they must be clearly defined (Ríos, 1994, pp. 31 and 34). 
Although the main focus of this study is to consider the trade-facilitation aspects of the rules 
of origin applied under regional or extraregional EIAs in which members of LAIA7 are involved 
(see chapter III), we must begin by looking at the main characteristics of the rules of origin applied 
by those countries. This is done in the following chapter. It should be noted that, given the close 
interrelationship between the subjects of the next two chapters, they are actually inseparable, and 
hence, they will appear to overlap on some of the matters discussed. 
                                                     
6  See, inter alia, Vermulst et al (1994); Krishna and Krueger (1995); and Estevadeordal (2002). 
7  Twelve countries are currently members of LAIA, namely: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
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II.  The Main Features of Rules of 
Origin in Preferential Trade 
Agreements in Latin America 
A.  Introduction 
We shall refer to specific EIAs without considering their depth 
or objectives, focusing instead on the formal regime of trade 
preferences they establish.8 The scope of an EIA may be regional or 
subregional, bilateral, between two groups of countries or between 
groups of countries and one country, or interregional. The concept of 
regionalism is a very broad one and may include EIAs signed by LAIA 
members but also those signed by them with other trading partners. 
Since each individual EIA establishes its own rules of origin, if a 
given country is participating in several EIAs, it will be 
simultaneously applying different rules of origin. The global pattern of 
rules of origin will become even more complex in the near future, 
inasmuch as it is expected that by 2005, 55 per cent of all trade in 
goods will be conducted under preferential arrangements, some of 
which are still being negotiated (Heydon, 2002). The greater the 
requirement for local inputs, the less favourable will be the EIA, with 
the small and less industrialized countries being the most affected by 
such arrangements. 
                                                     
8  There are differences of opinion in the specialized literature as to whether or not rules of origin are necessary in a customs union. See 
Asdrúbal (1978, p. 6), Celedón and Sáez (1995, p. 8), Meller (1996, p. 45), Izam (1997, p. 37). 
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In such cases, the higher the external tariffs of the EIA partners, the greater will be their 
impact (Krueger, 1995, p. 120). The inequitable distribution of benefits among production sectors, 
economic activities and countries has been studied by Garay and Estevadeordal (1996, pp. 16-17). 
In this respect, an ECLAC study (1994, pp. 78-80) stresses the importance of bearing in mind the 
danger that rules of origin could turn into a hidden tool for protectionism, leading to discrimination 
against those countries that are least able to take advantage of the potential offered by the expanded 
market. Consequently, although such rules are necessary, it may be advisable, in the interest of 
competitiveness and equity, to limit the requirements imposed. Thus, it is essential not to overlook 
the potentially asymmetrical effect that rules of origin might have among the countries of the 
region. This concern was also raised by SELA (1993), which drew attention to the fact that rules of 
origin could affect the countries with relatively less developed economies and less integrated 
industrial sectors. 
The procedures associated with rules of origin in the EIAs in the Americas are asymmetrical 
and have been applied discretionally (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). The matter of rules of 
origin is one of the most complex issues arising in the negotiation of an EIA.9 Indeed, they are 
almost as important as the liberalization regime itself. In a free trade agreement (FTA), rules of 
origin are also designed to prevent triangulation or diversion of trade, i.e., shipping goods via a 
member with lower tariffs in order to gain access to a country with higher tariffs. The rules of 
origin applied under EIAs in Latin America are quite complex and diverse (IDB, 2002, p. 15), and 
more thorough studies are needed (Estevadeordal, 2002, p. 20). 
It is possible, however, to minimize the costs involved in rules of origin under an EIA with a 
large membership by applying the criterion of regional cumulation in respect of intermediate goods 
and inputs from any of the members.10 Thus, a trilateral EIA is preferable to a bilateral one if, for 
example, the rules of origin require 50 per cent of regional or local value added. In that case, if a 
country can only comply with 25 per cent, it can still use imports from the remaining partners 
amounting to at least 25 per cent, so as to meet the 50 per cent requirement. This question will be 
discussed in greater detail later on. 
B.  Main Characteristics of the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) and its Rules of Origin 
The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) created by the Montevideo Treaty of 
1980 provides that at least two of its members may enter into a partial scope agreement (PSA) 
whereby tariff preferences are granted to participants. A PSA is the equivalent of an economic 
complementation agreement (ECA).11 There are currently around 55 ECAs, most of them bilateral. 
In the beginning, the idea was that the ECAs would eventually be turned into multilateral 
agreements, so they were all required to include a clause indicating that they would remain open to 
and subject to negotiation with any other member of LAIA. However, ten years later, the 
organization noted that there was a high degree of compartmentalization that was quite complex, 
both in terms of how the agreements were applied by the national administrations of member 
countries and in terms of how the economic agents in the region used them (LAIA, 1990, p. 1). The 
same document proposes certain measures that might be taken to make the existing ECAs more 
consistent, but so far not much progress has been made in that direction. The 1980 treaty also 
                                                     
9  On the question of complexity in NAFTA (Canada, United States and Mexico), see Krueger (1997, p. 172). 
10 In the case of autonomous or unilateral contractual preferences, three types of cumulation are used: full, diagonal or partial, and 
bilateral or granting-country content (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 31). 
11 As an EIA, LAIA goes beyond the purely legal scope of an ECA. Indeed, there are also two other basic and parallel instruments, 
namely, the regional tariff preference (RTP) and the regional scope agreement (RSA). 
CEPAL – SERIE Comercio internacional N° 31 
15 
allowed LAIA members to establish EIAs with non-LAIA partners, subject to their complying with 
certain conditions relating to other LAIA members.12 
In brief, the 1980 Montevideo Treaty allows for ECAs entered into under its legal covering 
to include certain provisions on specific issues, including rules of origin. That is why the LAIA 
agreement itself did not include rules of origin until seven years later, given that a number of 
different methods were already being applied in the existing ECAs. Thus, the first official LAIA 
rule of origin relating to trade in goods was established in 1987 (Resolution 78), and was designed 
to help unify, non-retroactively, the criteria applied by ECAs (LAIA, 1987). 
This rule of origin established by LAIA is brief and general in scope.13 It explains the criteria 
for determining when a good originates in a given member country. These criteria have to do 
mainly with goods that are wholly produced in a country, with changes in tariff classifications and 
with the stipulation that the CIF value at the port of destination or the CIF value at the maritime 
port of materials from third countries must not exceed 50 per cent of the FOB export value of the 
final good, or 60 per cent in the case of countries with relatively less developed economies. 
Allowance is made in specific cases for certain requirements to prevail over the aforementioned 
conditions; if such specific requirements are not included in the LAIA rule of origin, they must be 
approved by the LAIA Committee of Representatives. This is a good provision since it allows for 
an ECA to include special rules of origin by category or product based on the special needs of 
participating countries. The situation arises most often in the automotive sector (LAIA, 2001, pp. 
114-115). It should also be noted that where cumulation is concerned, the rule provides that 
domestic or local value only applies to value generated in countries belonging to a given ECA. 
The main problems that arose from the application of this rule had to do with the vagueness 
of the criteria for establishing the origin of merchandise that was not shipped directly from the 
exporting country to the importing country and to the fact that the rule did not accept the origin of a 
good when an invoice issued by a third country was attached to the certificate accompanying the 
merchandise, a practice that was fairly widespread practice throughout the world. LAIA took notice 
of these and other shortcomings in the rule and recognized that because of these legal gaps, 
members were interpreting the rule inconsistently and applying different and often inequitable 
criteria (LAIA, 2000). Some partial improvements were made, and the entire rule was finally 
updated in 1999, by Resolution 252. 
The new rule, which is still in force, is more specific and less open to interpretation than the 
previous one, but is far from adequate in the present international context. This is so obvious that 
the aforementioned LAIA document suggests some additional improvements. More recently, LAIA 
(2002) also discussed the need to review a different problem area, i.e., that of intermediate 
materials and de minimis provisions. The latter term has to do with exceptions designed to allow 
for flexibility in the application of rules of origin. LAIA has also discussed the need to improve 
criteria relating to containers and packing materials for shipment, and packaging materials and 
containers for retail sale, a subject that is now included in most EIAs (OECD, 2002, p. 10). 
If LAIA were to centralize these aspects, it would avoid having to deal with problems 
separately through the rules laid down in the different ECAs. This would be a positive step, not 
only because a standardized system would facilitate trade but also because a single rule would be 
less costly than the sum of expenditures involved in the ECAs (economies of scale). In brief, these 
rules will probably be updated in LAIA. In fact, it has been suggested that the present anachronism 
is partly responsible for the fact that some ECAs follow systems that are different from the LAIA 
                                                     
12 This has caused some problems, notably the problem created by the participation of Mexico in NAFTA. 
13 The entire text is only three pages long. 
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system. This is the case, for example, of Mercosur14 and the FTAs that Mercosur has entered into 
with Bolivia and with Chile, and of the ECA between Chile and Peru. Other ECAs have departed 
completely from the LAIA rule, such as the G-3 and the current Chile-Mexico EIA (ECA No. 41), 
which is different from the previous bilateral EIA between those two countries (ECA No. 17), 
which followed the LAIA rule. 
The question therefore arises: if the LAIA rule was applied in the previous Chile-Mexico 
ECA, why does the current one depart from it completely? This is an important point, considering 
that these two countries are the LAIA members that have signed the most EIAs with countries 
inside and outside LAIA. Indeed, they are the only two countries in LAIA that have signed 
(separately) ECAs with the European Union and with Central American countries. Moreover, 
although Mexico is already a member of NAFTA, which includes the United States, the United 
States is about to sign an EIA with Chile, which has already entered into an FTA with Canada. 
Although Chile and Mexico have very different interests when it comes to trade,15 they have 
both made considerable progress in regard to customs reforms and modernization. Indeed, it is well 
known that both countries have been made great strides in their efforts to facilitate trade. Another 
reason why Chile and Mexico deserve special recognition is that they have increased their trade 
substantially and have very good prospects for their own mutual trade. In brief, the common 
experiences of these two countries would seem to point to the need to take another look at the rules 
of origin of the LAIA family and compare them with those of NAFTA and the EIAs signed by 
Chile and by Mexico with the European Union. These two countries may have made their choices 
based on better results than those obtained within the context of LAIA. A comparative analysis of 
rules of origin is presented in the following section. 
C.  The Three Families of Rules of Origin 
This section is divided into two parts. The first refers to the extent to which the families of 
rules of origin provide detail and clarity, while the second focuses on how the rules have worked 
under the circumstances prevailing in the international economy. 
1. Detail and Clarity in Rules of Origin 
A common feature of the rules of origin of the NAFTA family and those of the EU family is 
that they were both negotiated for specific products. There are advantages and disadvantages to this 
approach. One disadvantage is that the negotiation process is protracted and complicated and the 
text produced is a very lengthy one. This can be a good thing, though, since the requirements for 
individual goods are very clear, leaving little room for interpretations that might create conflict. 
Thus, when requirements are spelled out product by product, the conditions that must be met are 
quite clear. 
Fundamentally, the rules of origin applied by these two families do not have much impact on 
Latin American and Caribbean producers. Since most of them only sell a limited range of products, 
they only have to learn the rules of origin for the goods that matter to them; thus, dealing with these 
two families is quite easy. This is not the case with producers or exporters who sell a wide range of 
goods, of whom there are few in the region. Nevertheless, since they are usually large exporters, 
                                                     
14 In Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and in LAIA ECA No. 18, the general rule originally required a 50 per cent 
local content, with preferential systems for Paraguay and Uruguay, considering they were less developed. At present, however, they all 
include a standard requirement of 60 per cent. 
15 In fact, while a high percentage of Chile's external trade in goods is conducted with members of LAIA, over 90 per cent of Mexico's 
external transactions in goods are with the United States. 
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they have considerable experience in international trade, so the NAFTA and EU rules do not 
represent an impossible hurdle for them. 
The LAIA rules of origin are different from those of NAFTA and EU in that they establish 
certain basic criteria for defining the nationality of products while allowing members to enter into 
separate agreements within the LAIA framework which provide for exceptions to be made in 
respect of certain products. The general criteria are quite basic, especially from the standpoint of 
compliance. This system is open to criticism, since it is very easy to meet the general criteria of 
origin. Thus, almost all goods traded under the EIAs are eligible for customs preferences. There is 
no provision for further screening to determine the exact nationality of a product. Such laxity 
leaves the rules open to different interpretations, so that sometimes they have to be brought before 
a specialized dispute-settlement tribunal. 
Although the Chile-Mercosur EIA basically follows the general criteria of the LAIA family 
with regard to origin, it also has some similarities with the NAFTA family, since it includes 
specific rules of nationality for a wider range of products than other ECAs. A similar situation 
obtains with regard to the Chile-Peru EIA. The Chilean EIAs and the EIAs between Mexico and the 
Central American countries are closer to the NAFTA model, since specific criteria prevail over 
general ones. 
2.  Adapting Rules of Origin to the New International Economy 
Given that the LAIA rules of origin easily give rise to contradictory interpretations, it would 
appear that they are not sufficiently clear and predictable. This creates insecurity among the trade 
and production sectors of member countries, which means that external economic agents are not 
able to plan ahead their investment and production strategies. Obviously, those countries that have 
entered into a large number of ECAs are more vulnerable to the conflicts arising from the 
vagueness of the rules. Nevertheless, there are some advantages to having more general rules, since 
members of a given ECA are able to make exceptions. Even so, the rules should be further 
developed in order to prevent disputes. 
The rules of origin established by NAFTA and the European Union are much more advanced 
than the LAIA rules. In fact, the lengthy texts containing the NAFTA and EU rules are not only 
more detailed and thorough, but they also include more specific conceptual definitions and 
procedural instructions. In addition, they include a greater number of criteria for establishing the 
nationality of merchandise; these criteria are explained in easy-to-understand terms, even in the 
case of subtle and seemingly insignificant details. They also cover a wide range of new issues that 
are only now being dealt with on the international economic scene. 
All things considered, the NAFTA family seems to work better than the other two, since it 
includes an article spelling out the requirements that must be met by exporters in order to apply the 
de minimis criterion, takes a very useful approach to the cumulation method, and deals with 
fungible goods and materials. Considering the importance of these issues, we shall discuss each 
one, using the Chile-Mexico EIA as a point of reference. 
a) De minimis. Two criteria are used to allow for flexibility. The first provides that, with 
a few exceptions, a good is originating, even if it does not meet the change-of-tariff-classification 
requirement, if the value of all non-originating materials used in producing is less than 8 per cent of 
the transaction value or, in certain cases, of the total value of the product. If the final product is 
subject to a value requirement and the non-originating value is no higher than one of the two 8-per-
cent figures just mentioned, it may be imputed as originating. The second criterion has to do with 
goods that must meet the value requirement. In such cases, the merchandise does not have to meet 
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the requirement if the value of non-originating materials is no higher than 8 per cent of the 
transaction value or, in certain cases, of the total cost. 
b) Cumulation. This point is not covered at all in other EIAs, since cumulation usually 
only adds value when merchandise or materials from other partners in an EIA are used in the final 
phase of production of the final good. This is the case with the Chile-Mexico agreement, but this 
EIA has an advantage in that it allows for a good to be considered originating even if it does not 
meet the rules pertaining to materials used in the final phase of production. Thus, when a material 
used in production of the final good originates in a third trading partner, that part of the material 
may be broken down and considered originating, and the same is true of all non-originating 
materials used, up to the first stage in the production chain. This criterion also operates in the 
Mexico-EU EIA, but individual partners may only impute values prior to the final stage of 
production when they are local and do not originate somewhere else. 
c) Fungible goods and materials.16 The text of the Chile-Mexico EIA defines fungibles 
as goods that are interchangeable for commercial purposes when they have identical properties, i.e., 
it is not possible to differentiate between them by mere visual observation. This applies, for 
example, to products like coffee, when they are stored in the same place without making any 
distinction as to their provenance, since a centralized system is more profitable (economies of sale). 
Thus, if a country exports such products, it must comply with the rule of origin in order to benefit 
from tariff preferences, but in a case like this, since the originating goods are stored together with 
similar products that do not meet the rules, the exporter may not sell under a preferential tariff 
regime any amount above that which is truly originating. This EIA includes provisions for such 
situations, for which reliable documentation is required. 
With regard to this point, some additional remarks are in order. The Chile-Mexico EIA is 
more advanced than the other ECAs under LAIA in that it is designed for present economic 
conditions. Of the three families studied, LAIA is the one that has had the greatest difficulty 
keeping current; its rules need to be improved, taking into account the Chile-Mexico case and 
bearing in mind the possibility of extending cumulation under an ECA to value added throughout 
LAIA. The more product-specific the rules of origin are, the greater will be the effort the State 
must make to disseminate the relevant information to the private sector, so as to enable it to take 
advantage of the opportunities this opens up. 
Finally, it is a mistake to think that a rule of origin that is thorough and detailed cannot also 
be clear and easy to understand. In order for such a rule to work properly, however, more 
sophisticated and efficient system of negotiation and implementation is required. This strengthens 
the argument that attention must be paid to the procedural aspects of rules of origin in EIAs; in the 
absence of expeditious mechanisms, even the clearest rule would not only be inoperative but would 
actually complicate trade. This observation leads us directly into the next chapter, in which the 
focus is on trade facilitation. 
                                                     
16 It is also worthwhile mentioning the criteria that apply to a final product that is liquid and consists of mixtures or combinations of 
inputs or intermediate materials. 
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III.  Administrative Procedures 
This chapter, which continues with the comparison between the 
three families of rules of origin, is divided into two sections. The first 
refers to the issuance of certificates of origin. The second deals with 
customs procedures pertaining to oversight, control and verification of 
origin, as well as the legal implications of non-compliance.  
A.  Issuance of Certificates of Origin 
As mentioned above, in order to be eligible for preferential 
tariffs in an EIA arrangement, the exporting country must make a 
statement on a certificate of origin especially designed for this 
purpose, to the effect that the good meets the requirements regarding 
origin. In this section, we explain the differences in procedures for 
issuing such a document. In addition to the formalities themselves, 
there are also differences in the financial and legal implications of this 
procedure. So far, no best procedure has been devised for issuing 
certificates of origin that also enhance trade facilitation. As noted 
below, the discussion on this point has not ended. 
1. The Latin American Integration Association 
In this case, certificates must be issued by a single public 
authority, which is always named in the text of the EIA. However, this 
authority may delegate this duty by signing it over to a national 
producers' or exporters' association. This has been done for raw 
materials, intermediate products and manufactured goods. In the case 
of more complex  goods,  such as those pertaining to health or 
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sanitation, the public authority may delegate this duty to a specialized technical institution. In any 
event, the certificate of origin must be reviewed and signed by the public institution, which always 
bears final responsibility for the certificate. Under LAIA, a separate certificate of origin is required 
for each commercial transaction. 
Consequently, all ECAs under LAIA require that every partner belonging to the ECA must 
state which of their officials are authorized to sign the certificates. As regards the form, the 
countries must provide LAIA and its individual members with a list of authorized signatures. They 
must also report, in timely fashion, any changes to this list, in order to keep the information up to 
date. This requirement is not always met, however, and problems arise because the signature that 
has been officially reported is not the one that appears on the certificate of origin received by the 
importing country. 
In such cases, the authority in the importing country rejects the certificate of origin because 
it has not been properly issued. Thus, because of negligence on the part of the public authority, the 
process is inefficient and will not improve until the situation is officially corrected. This causes 
unnecessary expense and delay for importers, through no fault of their own. The same problem 
arises when the authorized official is sick or on leave, and the document is filled out and signed by 
someone else who is not qualified to do so and whose name probably would not even be included 
in an updated list of authorized signatures. This procedural problem, which may also be attributed 
to inefficiency on the part of the authorities responsible for monitoring the export transaction,17 
complicates trade not only for importers but also for the public sector of the country concerned, 
which has to clarify the situation. 
The clarification process usually takes time, since exporters, acting through their customs 
agents, are required to re-apply for the certificate of origin in their country. The exporter usually 
covers the cost of this application,18 which in some countries is slowed down by excessive red tape. 
This is not the case with Chile, where SOFOFA, the main private certifying agency, which deals 
with over 90 per cent of exports of goods to LAIA countries, has made significant progress in 
streamlining the process, which is now fully computerized. However, the fact that electronic 
signatures are still not accepted in all LAIA countries is a hindrance, preventing SOFOFA from 
issuing the document more efficiently and making it necessary for the exporter to pick it up 
personally. Rapid approval of electronic signatures by LAIA would greatly facilitate this whole 
process. 
Another important aspect of the Chilean arrangement is that SOFOFA works with a high 
degree of professionalism; its customs agents require producers to provide the information 
considered necessary to verify whether or not the product complies with the rule of origin. Some 
Chilean exporters object to this, although one might think the opposite would be the case, i.e., that 
they would be interested in promoting the country's international image. The strategy implemented 
by the Chilean authorities has clearly brought savings that significantly benefit the country, in both 
the private and the public sectors, over the short, medium and long terms. 
It is important, however, to consider the criticisms put forward by some in the private sector, 
who believe that SOFOFA is overzealous, given that the standards it enforces are high compared 
with those applied by certifying agencies in some other LAIA countries. This is clearly unfair to 
Chilean exporters, as well as to importers, who face the risk of having to pay customs duties, as 
they do if the customs authorities of their country doubt the origin of a product. Moreover, any 
suspicion by the authorities of an importing country that the exporting country has issued a 
                                                     
17 Problems with certificates of origin are also caused by other factors which, to a greater or lesser extent, affect all the EIAs considered 
in this study. For example, the complications that arise when merchandise passes in transit through a third country, when different 
criteria are applied for customs valuation or for defining product categories or classifying goods. 
18 At a cost of about US$ 10 per transaction, 2% of which is for public-sector oversight. 
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certificate of origin containing errors, of content or of form, has legal implications for the public 
authorities of all members of the ECA. 
An efficient and suitable solution to this whole issue would be for LAIA to take such 
institutional measures as may be necessary to raise standards and make them consistent, and to 
require compliance with those standards by all authorized domestic certifying agencies, ensuring 
that the criteria used are equivalent in all cases. This would also improve the economic image of 
the region as a whole on the international scene, with all the benefits that would bring. It would 
also be a good thing for the individual members of LAIA. 
2.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
The NAFTA system is radically different from the one applied by LAIA. The underlying 
philosophy in NAFTA is that the role of the public sector should be minimized in order to allow for 
greater participation by the private sector; this is based on the assumption that the fiscal authority 
trusts the private sector to perform this role effectively. Thus, the method applied is self-
certification, which means that the certificate of origin is issued directly by the exporter or the 
producer who sends the product to the EIA partner. In this process, the authorities of the exporting 
country do not participate and are not responsible for the form or the accuracy of the information 
provided in certificates. This system is more efficient that the one applied by LAIA, since it is more 
expeditious. Another advantage over LAIA and EU, where a separate certificate has to be issued 
for every transaction, is that in NAFTA the certificate is valid for similar transactions over a period 
of one year. This is significant inasmuch as it greatly reduces transaction costs to private agents and 
thus facilitates external trade. 
Another positive aspect of NAFTA is that when questions arise concerning origin or possible 
fraud, the responsibility falls on the individuals concerned, not on the EIA signatories. This means 
that the problem is not a matter of public law, as it is in LAIA and EU, but rather it must be settled 
under private law, since it is the entrepreneurs themselves who have to deal with it. For a variety of 
reasons, it is better if the dispute is between individuals than between governments, especially 
since it is desirable to avoid unnecessary friction, with the resulting political cost to government 
authorities of the EIA signatories. The economic cost of non-compliance with origin requirements 
is borne by the importer, who is not legally liable unless it is demonstrated that he or she 
participated in a fraudulent action, in complicity with the exporter. If documents are altered or an 
offence is committed, the issuer of the certificate of origin, i.e., the exporter, is always held liable 
under the law. 
The text of the NAFTA rule of origin clearly stipulates that in such cases, both the importer 
and the exporter must be prosecuted under the legislation of each of the countries involved. Every 
country that has entered into an EIA of this type has legislation in force for punishing importers. 
However, that is not the case when it comes to prosecuting exporters, as is the case of Chile. 
Indeed, even though Chile has signed EIAs with Canada and with Mexico, it still has not enacted 
legislation to prosecute exporters who commit this type of offence. Consequently, the 
aforementioned EIAs tend to favour the Chileans; unless changes are made, that will be the case 
with the EIA that Chile is about to sign with the United States.19 
Another positive aspect of rules of origin in the NAFTA family of EIAs is the fact that, 
although, as in LAIA, there is a specific administrative committee for each EIA, in NAFTA there 
are also other special committees, one of which deals with trade in goods. This committee has four 
subcommittees, two of which are pertinent to our discussion, i.e., the committees on customs and 
                                                     
19 The relevant bill, which was drafted after Chile had signed an EIA with Canada, is still pending in the Chilean legislature, along with 
other bills relating to commitments undertaken by Chile in connection with some of the Uruguay Round agreements.  
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the committee on rules of origin. Both have clear objectives and meet regularly or at the request of 
a partner. These bodies are very important from the standpoint of trade facilitation. It is a great 
advantage to be able to identify problems quickly and work on settling disputes as soon as they 
arise. 
Despite the aforementioned positive features of the NAFTA arrangements, there are some 
problems. These arise from the fact that the declaration of origin can easily be altered by producers 
or exporters in order to make it appear that their goods are in compliance. Partners in an EIA may 
apply two types of controls, which are basically different in terms of their form and their substance. 
The first works through the private sector and the second through the public sector. 
It should be noted that the private sector is implicitly encouraged to exercise oversight by the 
very philosophy underlying the NAFTA system. To the extent that NAFTA delegates oversight 
responsibilities to the private sector, it is trusting that private economic agents will want to 
implement the best possible controls. There are two different ways to exercise this oversight. 
Firstly, when a producer or exporter expresses misgivings, having information that causes them to 
suspect or know that a domestic competitor is exporting goods under the tariff preferences of a 
partner country but that the product in question does not really meet the origination requirements. 
Secondly, when a producer or importer in the importing country who is a competitor of the firm 
carrying out the transaction, suspects that a product imported with tariff preferences does not meet 
the origination requirements for such preferences. In other words, they believe they are the victims 
of unfair competition. 
All this is based on the assumption that both the export and the import markets operate with 
absolute transparency and that there is a free and timely flow of information between economic 
agents. It is further assumed that importers in one country have full confidence in exporters in the 
partner country; otherwise, if it were shown that there was fraud on the part of the exporters, they 
(the importers) would have to pay non-preferential prices for their imports. This would not be 
profitable, since the actual cost of the product would be higher than what they had expected to pay 
with the tariff preferences, causing them to lose their competitive edge on the local market. The 
system is not as equitable as one might think, since it is based on the assumption that an economic 
agent – large or small – who is affected by unfair practices would have the necessary information, 
time and money to detect irregularities and take action, and this may not always be the case. 
The second type of control is that which is exercised by the public sector. In this regard, it 
may be worthwhile to touch briefly on a few matters that will be discussed more fully in the next 
section. These issues have significant implications, especially for the less developed countries. 
Since the emphasis in NAFTA oversight is on the private sector, the public sector does not play as 
strong a role in that regard as it does in those families of rules in which the public sector of the 
importing country plays a vital oversight role. This is the case especially in countries where the 
public sector does not have the human, economic and electronic resources needed to implement 
oversight efficiently. 
Since public oversight by customs authorities is selective on the matter of origin, no matter 
how efficiently they may work, they will never be able to guarantee that every case of fraud will be 
discovered. The fact that up to now very few disputes have arisen in connection with the Chile-
Mexico EIA may be interpreted as an indication either that the system has worked well or that it 
has not allowed for problems to be identified. This is vital, given that not failure to discover a 
customs offence regarding origin has a social cost for the importing country as a whole. 
Consequently, the NAFTA family requires, especially in the case of developing countries 
participating in this type of EIA, that these countries strengthen their customs oversight capacity, in 
order to improve efficiency. In order for this to be possible, the countries need to develop the 
necessary administrative and technical capabilities. This means, inter alia, that they need financial 
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resources in order to train the staff needed and improve electronic systems for ensuring the 
accuracy of controls. 
3.  The European Union Family 
As expected, the procedure for issuing certificates of origin in this family is more like that 
used in LAIA than like NAFTA. No provision is made for self-certification, given that the 
participation of public agencies is required. Although in practice certificates of origin are filled out 
by exporters, they must be endorsed by a public agency, particularly as regards content. Unlike the 
situation in LAIA, no private entities are authorized to perform this task. During the negotiations 
on this issue, the Chileans argued that their public sector did not have the economic capacity 
necessary to take responsibility for all these duties. They managed to get the European Union to 
agree that private subcontractors could be hired to fill out the certificate of origin, provided that 
they would be subject to oversight by the public agency, which would still have the ultimate 
responsibility in the matter. This was the first time such an arrangement was allowed under an EIA 
with the European Union. 
In the European Union family, whenever the authority of the importing country discovers a 
problem with a certificate of origin, the importer is held liable and is given 30 days to complete a 
new certificate, which must be requested from the exporter. When this has happened in Mexico, the 
Mexican importers have had tremendous problems getting a new certificate of origin from 
exporters in the European Union, who usually either do not send it at all or do so after the deadline. 
In such cases, the Mexican customs authorities require the importer to pay the full tariffs. This 
creates uncertainty about the future among importers. 
According to the Mexicans,20 the reason some European exporters are reluctant to correct a 
certificate of origin or send a new one is that they are not willing to incur the costs involved in the 
additional procedures, since that would reduce their profits from the export transaction. Some of 
the European exporters claim that the Mexican market is not very important to them. The question 
arises as to what will happen with the Chile-European Union EIA, since the Chilean market is even 
smaller than the Mexican one. It might be possible to correct this asymmetry, which works against 
the countries with smaller economies, by amending the texts of the two EIAs to include a clause 
requiring exporters to complete the certificate correctly. This would facilitate mutual trade and 
offer greater stability to importers. We will return to the matter of EIA renegotiation later on. 
When the government agency has substantive questions about the origin of a given 
merchandise, it cautiously requests information from the public institution of the exporting country. 
If after a proper investigation, this entity finds that the origin of the product was correctly stated, 
the public authority of the country requesting verification usually accepts that reply. One might 
wonder about this procedure, but the system works this way because of the implicit trust between 
the official parties concerned, usually the customs authorities.21 Questions may still arise, given 
that neither the form nor the depth of control is clearly stated. Moreover, the governmental agency 
responsible for oversight of exports is carrying out a formality, at the request of the importing 
country, which is viewed almost as a favour or a diplomatic gesture of good will. 
In fact, the application of rules of origin in the texts of EIAs between LAIA members and the 
European Union is referred to as administrative cooperation, and is even viewed as mutual 
assistance. In the NAFTA family, on the other hand, the text refers to customs procedures. In the 
two families mentioned, the issue is raised towards the end of the text, which refers solely to the 
                                                     
20 Personal interviews conducted by the author of this study with individuals in the public and private sectors of Mexico. 
21 Except in the case of Chile, in respect of which the European Union agreed that this responsibility would be assumed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs through its Directorate of Economic Affairs. 
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implementation of procedures. In LAIA, where procedures are not included in a separate section of 
the rules but rather at the end, it is understood that procedures will be implemented in the context 
of administration rather than of cooperation or mutual assistance. 
This suggests that up to now LAIA has underestimated the matter of trade facilitation, at 
least where origin is concerned; so have most of the member countries, since practically all their 
ECAs follow the LAIA pattern of not putting operational procedures in a separate section. This 
shows that they still have difficulty identifying the analytical differences between the rules and 
their application so as to ensure that they complement each other efficiently. 
In the EU family, certificates of origin have to be issued on paper of a certain colour and 
quality, which are clearly spelled out.22 This is done as a precaution against forgery. However, this 
creates some problems, since there is not much chance that this format could be used with 
electronic signatures; also, the right certificate might not always be available on the market. It is 
sometimes possible to get around this problem by using certificates that are similar but not of the 
colour stipulated in the EIA. This situation has arisen often with Mexican imports of goods from 
the European Union, causing unnecessary delays and cost to importers, several of whom have had 
to pay the full customs duties when no solution was found. 
Finally, we shall refer to the issuance of certificates of origin in existing EIAs or those under 
negotiation which involve LAIA members but envisage procedures other than those of the three 
families considered above. We shall begin with the EIAs signed by Chile with Mercosur and with 
Peru, which apply a NAFTA-type procedure in addition to that of LAIA. In these EIAs, exporters 
request the certificate of origin from the specialized agency authorized by the corresponding public 
entity (LAIA), for which purpose they must submit a sworn statement that includes background 
information to support their claim that the merchandise in question meets the origin requirements 
of the EIA. This means that, to some extent, the direct producer or the exporter of the merchandise 
is also held accountable for the accuracy of the claim of origin. It may also be an indication that the 
LAIA criteria in this regard could be improved. 
Secondly, there is the case of the EIA between Chile and the Republic of Korea, which 
provides the first example of a mixed system for issuing certificates of origin. Products that are 
exported from Chile to the Republic of Korea are self-certified, while the certificate of origin for 
products exported from the Republic of Korea to Chile are issued by the public agency in the 
Republic of Korea. This solution satisfies both parties, since both the Government and the 
importers in the Republic of Korea trust the Chilean exporters. Chilean importers are also satisfied, 
since they would rather have a public authority be responsible for issuing certificates of origin for 
exports from the Republic of Korea. Both the Government and the exporters in the Republic of 
Korea feel the system works well – the Government, because it ensures that the country projects a 
good image, and the exporters, because they avoid costly procedures and simplify their operations. 
In the third place, the question of origin has been the subject of an ongoing discussion in the 
negotiations to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).23 The main problem that 
has to be addressed is the issue of administrative procedures, given that a decision has to be taken 
as to who should be responsible for issuing certificates of origin. In the final draft of the FTAA text 
(FTAA, 2002), the chapter on rules of origin has not yet been fully developed; although some 
significant progress has been made,24 much remains to be done before consensus can be reached. 
The same is true of the chapter on customs procedures, where some countries hold very different 
positions. The most controversial issue is that of the form of certificates of origin. For example, 
                                                     
22 The format of the certificate of origin is similar to that which has traditionally been used in the LAIA countries for goods to enter the 
European market through the GSP, although the colours are different. 
23 FTAA would include all LAIA members except Cuba. 
24 An ad hoc group was set up in September 2002 to examine the LAIA rules of origin. In this regard, see Cerro (2002). 
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Canada, Chile and Mexico are in favour of self-certification, while Mercosur and CAN insist on 
using their own systems.25 The biggest surprise is the position of the United States, which wants the 
certificate to be issued by importers. 
The United States proposal has a positive side and a negative side. The positive aspect is that 
the importers themselves will always be responsible for bearing the economic and legal costs, as 
the case may be, of an improperly issued certificate of origin; consequently, it will be in their 
interest to ensure that proper procedures are followed. This argument is based on the fact that some 
United States importers do not have full confidence that self-certification would work in the 34 
countries that would comprise FTAA, given that most of them have not enacted legislation to 
punish customs fraud committed by exporters.26 The negative aspect of the United States proposal 
is that it is difficult for importers to obtain the information needed to verify compliance with 
origination requirements, since that information must come from the exporting country.  
Clearly, this negative aspect is not an insignificant matter. Aside from the positive aspect of 
the proposal, this procedure could further complicate mutual trade in goods in the framework of 
FTAA and actually discourage transactions. Finally, it should be noted that what is happening in 
FTAA on this issue is typical of what is happening in other spheres of negotiation, given that it is 
still not clear which one of the existing procedures is best or whether it would be preferable to 
combine several of them. More thinking is required in order to clarify the remaining questions. 
B.  Customs Oversight, Verification and Control 
1. Customs Oversight in General and in Regard to Origin 
In the past, customs agencies throughout the world focused mainly on oversight duties aimed 
at preventing fraud and smuggling and ensuring the collection of taxes on imports and exports. 
Indirectly, customs enforcement also helped improve the collection of domestic taxes levied when a 
product entered the national territory. Although customs agencies are still responsible for 
enforcement and oversight, the importance of these duties has lessened over time. Customs is an 
age-old institution and must evolve in order to keep up with the times. 
In this regard, two crucial issues must be considered. In the first place, at present there are 
virtually no customs duties on exports; those that still exist are an exception, and under binding 
agreements already in force in WTO, they are slated to be eliminated in the near future. Moreover, 
the collection of customs duties has become less important owing to the significant reduction, 
throughout the world, of import duties, thanks to the progress made in the Tokyo and Uruguay 
rounds, the last two conducted by what is now WTO. 
The second point is that customs authorities have gradually been taking on an additional 
responsibility which has now become a central one, owing to the need to modernize their 
operations. They are striving to facilitate administrative procedures relating to external trade, the 
volume of which has grown dramatically in recent decades, especially as a result of the 
liberalization processes mentioned above. The basic purpose of this effort is to reduce the 
transaction costs of internationally traded goods by expediting procedures. The globalization of the 
international economy makes it all the more necessary to facilitate customs procedures. It should be 
borne in mind that the forthcoming WTO negotiations on facilitation of customs procedures may 
result in binding multilateral rules in this regard. 
                                                     
25 CAN is made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
26 As far as legislation is concerned, those countries have still not advanced as much as Chile. 
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Recent advances in technology also point to the importance of customs procedures in trade 
facilitation. Thanks to the latest generation of electronic processes, the quality of customs 
operations can be greatly improved; this will automatically improve the efficiency of oversight, 
given that the two processes are interrelated. This will make it possible to reduce customs fraud and 
offences, discretional application of rules and corruption among customs officials, and to 
streamline customs procedures relating to international trade. The adoption of up-to-date technical 
and administrative tools enhances customs oversight, and this in turn affects all other customs 
operations, including those relating to trade facilitation. 
Customs oversight is a broad category of activities carried out in every area of customs work 
relating both to exports and to imports. Imports receive more oversight, given that they entail 
bringing goods into the national territory. One of the main subjects of oversight where imports are 
concerned is that of valuation of merchandise, the purpose of which is to prevent over- or under-
invoicing and to identify practices that might involve unfair competition. Another central area of 
oversight has to do with whether or not a given product meets origination requirements, especially 
if preferential tariffs are being requested. 
Since there is no real need for oversight of exports, as far as origination is concerned, they 
are not inspected. Hence, the discussion of oversight regarding origin only refers to imports. There 
are different ways to conduct oversight, and the specific tasks involved in each case may be carried 
out simultaneously or separately; each one is important in itself. There are four main types of 
customs oversight; three involve random inspections, while the fourth is a non-random and simpler, 
more routine, inspection. These tasks are described below, in non-hierarchical order. 
The first type of oversight, which is not random, is physical inspection, also referred to as 
physical appraisal. This consists of a rapid inspection by a customs agent (when the merchandise 
does not arouse suspicion), with documents in hand, of the merchandise imported. This inspection 
is carried out as soon as the shipment is unloaded. A second type of inspection, which is carried out 
on a random basis, begins before the product reaches the border. This consists of performing a 
computer analysis of risk, using a program that has previously been fed with pertinent information 
obtained by the customs authority and with documents associated with both the specific import and 
previous imports shown in the importer's history. This analysis may point to the need for a more 
exhaustive physical appraisal to be conducted once the import arrives. In this case, the physical 
inspection itself is similar to the first one described herein, but it is more thorough. 
A third type of oversight, which is also random, consists of putting the imported merchandise 
(which has already been through the preliminary inspection) through a process of selection by the 
red light/green light method. If the red light turns on, a more thorough inspection is carried out, 
similar to the second type just described. The fourth type of inspection is different from the other 
three in that the others are all conducted upon arrival of the merchandise, whereas in this case, the 
inspection, also random, is carried out after the goods have been removed from the customs area. 
The public authority usually has up to three years in which to complete this inspection. Since it 
involves reviewing documentation, all documents relating to the import must be kept for five or six 
years, as stipulated in the legislation of the importing country. Either the customs agent in charge of 
the commercial transaction in question, or the importer himself, is responsible for keeping a record 
of the relevant data. The random aspect of this inspection is quite interesting, since it involves a 
broad set of variables that are all fed into a complex computer programme. 
Some general comments are in order with regard to the above oversight activities. Firstly, in 
order to ensure efficiency, the customs authorities need financial resources so as to be able to 
acquire the necessary technologies and hire a professional staff of agents specializing in the 
different economic sectors. This is not easy, given the limited budgets of the customs authorities in 
the region. Secondly, since customs oversight is carried out by a State agency, financing should not 
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be subject to a cost-benefit criterion, although this is usually what happens. In fact, there are even 
cases in which the continuation of an investigation is made contingent upon a cost-benefit criterion, 
i.e., the commercial transaction must be a fairly large one and there must be a high probability of 
fraud, or even an assurance of a positive finding. In such cases, there is a direct relationship 
between the difficulty of enforcing origin requirements and the magnitude of the economic cost 
associated with oversight. To get around this and avoid exhaustive oversight, some importers have 
chosen to carry out several small imports instead of a single large transaction. 
The third comment applies to cases where a country has several ports of entry for 
merchandise and hence, several customs facilities. If rules of origin are vague and open to 
interpretation, the customs agents posted at the different points of entry might apply them 
discretionally, i.e., different ports might apply different criteria, and this can lead to discriminatory 
or unfair treatment. Fourth, the countries use all the aforementioned types of oversight regardless 
of whether the rules or criteria for determining origin are specific to a given country or are part of 
an EIA arrangement. 
The fifth comment is that there is a direct relationship between the difficulty of enforcing 
rules of origin and the number of EIAs a country has signed.27 Moreover, there is an reverse 
relationship between the number of EIAs a country has signed and the extent to which trade is 
facilitated.28 And finally, it is pertinent to mention that in addition to the oversight methods 
described above, the EIAs have also set up their own oversight procedures. This is the subject of 
the next section. 
2.  Oversight and Verification of Origin in Economic Integration 
Agreements and Legal Implications of Non-Compliance 
Although some of the topics covered in this section have been mentioned separately above, 
we shall now take a more systematic approach. 
a) The LAIA family. This system has limitations when it comes to oversight. 
Verification of the origin of merchandise takes place when a country belonging to an EIA considers 
that a certificate of origin filled out by an authorized trade organization and issued by the 
competent public authorities does not meet the substantive requirements of origin. The authorities 
of the importing country report this to the public agency of the exporting country, so that it can take 
such measures as it deems necessary to solve the problem. As far as the importing country is 
concerned, it is allowed to apply the necessary fiscal safeguards. 
This is the only verification process provided for in the LAIA family, and this is clearly a 
weakness. Thus, a unilateral interpretation can lead to disputes because there are no criteria on how 
to proceed or what action should be taken. No time limits are established, and there is no indication 
as to what body should deal with the problem. These shortcomings have made it necessary for all 
the ECAs in LAIA to try to fill the gap left by these omissions; as mentioned earlier, this effort 
would be facilitated if there were a clearer general rule on the matter in LAIA.29 An example 
illustrating this situation is provided at the end of this section. 
b) The NAFTA family. In this system, the importing authority may request the exporter 
to provide information on the origin of a good. Three non-exclusive procedures may be followed: 
written questionnaires may be sent directly to producers or exporters; verification visits may be 
                                                     
27 Interviews conducted by the author with some Chilean officials in this area showed that this is the situation in Chile. This is evidenced 
in the fact that Chile is presently working with eight different types of rules and formats for certifying the origin of a product. 
28 This was also confirmed by the author in personal interviews with people in the private sector of Chile. 
29 It should be noted that practically all the 55 ECAs have created their own dispute-settlement tribunals. This is clearly more costly than 
it would be to have a single central tribunal. 
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made to an exporter or a producer, in order to examine the documentation showing compliance 
with the rules and inspect the facilities used in producing the merchandise and, if necessary, the 
locations where the materials are produced; and other procedures may be followed as agreed by the 
partners. The first of these is used most often, and the third has not yet been used.  
The least used procedure is that of verification visits. It would appear that the questionnaire 
has proven quite adequate, so visits have only been necessary in special cases. However, that is not 
necessarily true. It should be borne in mind that in order for direct verification to take place, the 
importer, through the competent customs authority, is required to notify in writing its intention of 
carrying out a visit. This notification must be sent to the exporter or producer and to the customs 
authority in the exporting country. Finally, the customs authority must obtain the written consent of 
the exporter or producer. If this authorization is not received within a given time limit, which is set 
by the parties concerned, imports will not be subject to the tariff preferences established in the EIA. 
This directly affects the importer, who will have to pay non-preferential tariffs. 
The verification visit is conducted by customs officials from the importing country. 
However, the exporter or producer is entitled to appoint two observers to be present during the 
visit, strictly as observers. If the customs authority of the importing countries finds that there has 
been non-compliance with origin requirements, before that finding can be implemented, both the 
importer and the person who filled out and signed the certificate of origin must be notified. As far 
as the legal aspects are concerned, each trading partner applies the penal, civil or administrative 
sanctions provided for in its domestic legislation or regulations. Should it be necessary, the parties 
can always resort to a specialized agency to settle the dispute. In that event, the parties may choose 
whether to use the institutions established under the EIA or those of the WTO. 
In brief, a verification visit involves the participation of a team of highly specialized officials 
of the importing country's customs authority. Such a visit lasts on average around four working 
days. The process entails a considerable financial cost, including not only the air fare and 
subsistence expenses for the visiting officials, but also the cost of the officials' absence from work 
at their own customs facility. This may be why the system is not often used, given that the cost of 
using questionnaires is much lower. One might conclude that the few problems that have arisen 
regarding origin in this family are caused by the weaknesses in the oversight system which does not 
have the level of financing that might be required. 
This may be the case with the Chile-Mexico EIA. Chile tries to avoid these visits, either 
because of the expense involved or because the transaction which is the subject of inspection does 
not involve large sums; in addition, there must be some assurance that the visit will make it 
possible to identify non-compliance. Despite the tremendous efforts that have been made to 
improve the budget of the Chilean customs authority, the financing available for oversight is still 
inadequate, and this affects the number of visits to be made, especially when there are also 
budgetary restrictions relating to the performance and results of oversight regarding origin. In other 
words, careful consideration has to be given to the question of whether or not an inspection visit is 
worth the expense. This is also the case with Mexico, although to a lesser degree. All this should be 
taken as an important warning for FTAA. Indeed, if the developing countries have budgetary 
restrictions which hinder customs oversight, they should be concerned about the possibility of the 
NAFTA system of inspection visits being carried over to FTAA without some kind of adjustments 
and safeguards. 
In the case of Chile, there is another factor, involving pressure, that discourages efficient 
oversight. If the customs authority does not meet a certain economic goal for revenue collections 
resulting from oversight, the staff will not receive an annual bonus (an additional month's salary). 
This bonus is given to the staff when they surpass the goal. Moreover, although the budget is not 
quite as limited as in the past, the Chilean customs authority still has difficulty purchasing 
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equipment and up-to-date computer systems. It is still understaffed, so there are not enough 
qualified officials to improve the efficiency of oversight activities that could make expensive 
verification visits unnecessary. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that it is not enough for rules of origin to be properly 
negotiated and clearly established in the text of an EIA if the text does not describe in detail the 
administrative procedures to be followed in order to implement the rules. In addition, the types of 
oversight provided for in EIAs should be "user-friendly". In brief, the administrative procedures 
involved in implementing rules of origin, which are so important to trade facilitation, play a 
fundamental role in determining whether rules of origin, seen as a whole, are truly effective. 
c) The EU family. In this case, the competent national authorities are responsible for 
issuing certificates of origin and for taking the measures necessary to verify compliance. They are 
empowered to require any kind of proof and to inspect exporters' books as well as to carry out any 
other kind of verification they may consider necessary for a proper investigation. Verification itself 
is conducted at random or whenever the authorities of the importing countries have reasonable 
questions about the form of the certificate of origin. 
When there is suspicion regarding the content of the certificate, the customs authorities of 
the importing country must return the relevant documentation to the authority of the exporting 
country, stating the reasons why an investigation is in order and attaching all necessary background 
information. All this documentation is sent along with a request for a posteriori verification. The 
authorities of the exporting country then conduct the investigation as they see fit. During this 
process, although questions may be raised as to whether the authority of the importing country is 
taking a passive approach, it is empowered to temporarily suspend preferential tariffs for the 
products under investigation.  
The authority of the exporting country must present a report to the importing country as soon 
as possible and within 10 months at the latest. If the reply is received in time and suspicions 
remain, the tariff benefits may be permanently suspended. The 10-month deadline seems too long 
from the standpoint of trade facilitation. If the authorities involved do not reach an agreement after 
the verification process has been completed, the case must be submitted to the ad hoc committee on 
customs cooperation and rules of origin of the EIA. This is a limitation resulting from the fact that 
customs procedures in this family of rules of origin fall within the scope of "administrative 
cooperation". 
If the dispute continues after verification, it is not taken to a dispute-settlement tribunal, as 
would normally be the case in an EIA, but rather to the aforementioned committee. The duties of 
this committee have not been explicitly spelled out, even though it is similar to the NAFTA body 
mentioned earlier, except that the NAFTA one has clearly stated objectives. In order to avoid 
diplomatic conflicts and political friction between signatories of an EIA, the importer may, at its 
own Government's suggestion, cover economic costs that are not really its responsibility. Finally, 
differences between importers and their national authorities are settled in accordance with the 
domestic legislation of the country concerned. 
Finally, from the standpoint of oversight and verification of origin in the EIAs studied, as 
well as of the legal implications of non-compliance, it is obvious that overall, NAFTA, even with 
all its weaknesses, is the most efficient system; it is followed by the EU, with LAIA coming in 
third. NAFTA and EU can be improved without too much effort, in order to facilitate trade. The 
weaknesses of LAIA in this regard seem to point to the need for more radical change. 
One example of the weakness of LAIA is illustrated by the EIA between Chile and 
Mercosur. This EIA includes a section on oversight and control relating to rules of origin which 
basically is taken from the NAFTA family. However, owing to lack of experience, the signatories 
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did not clearly define the time limits for certain procedures. The shortcomings in this ECA have led 
to considerable friction between the partners, to the point that they have had no choice but to 
renegotiate the agreement. 
The more general issue of renegotiation of an EIA is discussed in Box 1. In this particular 
case, according to the Chilean negotiators, the renegotiation, which began quite some time ago, will 
last for several months more, at considerable economic cost. The entire chapter on rules of origin 
of the ECA will have to be redrafted; that task is currently being carried out by Chilean 
professionals. The process will be a lengthy one, given that each of the four Mercosur countries 
must first approve the changes, after which they must all agree, and the negotiations will continue 
until consensus is finally reached with Chile. 
Box 1 
































































allowNo matter how insignificant the text to be amended may seem once an EIA is 
ed, the amendment process is quite costly in terms of time and money. This is a matter 
 should be considered in advance. This also applies in the case of rules of origin, in 
ect to both content and form; when new elements are included, the formal aspects of 
rules must also be revised, or new points may have to be added. For obvious reasons, 
cost of the process is directly related to the number of countries belonging to an EIA, as 
 as to the complexity of the issues to be renegotiated and the number of formalities that 
t be complied with. 
Certain points that at first seem to be insignificant will often turn out to be extremely 
rtant. Indeed, this is often the case with simple details, administrative processes or 
edures, which however are of vital importance to ensure that the EIA as a whole will 
 efficiently. An EIA is essentially an unfinished and perfectible phenomenon and should 
efore be drafted in such a way that it can be changed on a regular basis in order to 
re that it fits the changing environment in which it operates. When the changes relate 
sues or procedural aspects that could not have been foreseen at the time the original 
ement was negotiated, these problems should be rectified as soon as they are 
tified. It makes sense to anticipate the costs that arise from the need to renegotiate 
ific points or the EIA as a whole. 
Experience shows, however, that this is not often done. What usually happens is that 
ng the initial negotiations, the importance of certain aspects is underestimated, although 
negotiators may be aware of them. Sometimes they do not realize that some issues 
d in the text could create an unnecessary bottleneck. This is often due to the fact that, 
n faced with political pressure to sign an EIA quickly, the negotiators do not have time 
re not able to cover all the details as thoroughly as necessary in order to facilitate 
ual trade in the future. 
In such cases, it might be better to address difficulties that arise during negotiations 
 to think strategically about every detail, even if this takes longer. Otherwise, it will be 
ssary later on to make changes that could have been anticipated and avoided before 
EIA was signed, with all the cost that renegotiation entails, especially when several 
tries are involved. At any rate, if an EIA has to be signed quickly, for political reasons, 
out allowing the necessary time for the negotiators and the private sector of the 
omies concerned to review it thoroughly, it would at least be a good idea to make 
ances for the expense that will be incurred by the inevitable renegotiation. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This paper deals with rules of origin and related procedures as 
they apply to goods; very little work has been done so far on rules of 
origin as they relate to services. Further studies are needed in that 
area. Even in the case of final goods, however, commercial services 
must be reflected in the price of inputs, and are therefore one 
component of final export value. This study reviews the existing rules 
of origin, focusing on those embodied in the main economic 
integration agreements (EIAs) entered into by member countries of the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), either among 
themselves or with other regions. Specific comments on certain 
ongoing negotiations are also included. 
This study focuses especially on Chile and Mexico, because 
these two countries stand out from other LAIA members in that they 
have individually entered into quite a few EIAs with other countries, 
including a bilateral agreement between the two of them. To be more 
specific, we explore the question of why, although both Chile and 
Mexico are members of LAIA, their current EIA does not follow the 
LAIA rules of origin or related procedures. Instead, it follows the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), model of rules of 
nationality and procedures. Moreover, Chile and Mexico are the only 
two LAIA members that have individually entered into bilateral EIAs 
with the European Union (EU), applying very similar rules of origin 
and procedures. Both Chile and Mexico have made a considerable 
effort to reform their customs structures and facilitate international 
trade. 
This paper refers to the specialized literature and the texts of the 
relevant EIAs, as well as to personal interviews conducted by the 
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author in Chile and Mexico with public and private officials concerned with the subject. A 
comparative study is made of the three families of rules of origin and related procedures, namely 
those applied by LAIA, NAFTA and the European Union. The main conclusions are grouped under 
three thematic headings. The first refers to substantive issues arising from the rules of origin 
themselves. The second refers to related formal or procedural aspects. The third consists of some 
final reflections. 
Conclusions on the content of the rules of origin examined 
1. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has not yet developed binding multilateral rules of 
origin; some progress has been made, although only in the field of non-preferential international 
trade. In this regard, it is worthwhile stressing the contributions of the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)/United Nations 
Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT). Countries will have to learn 
to live with different rules of origin, especially for international trade of a preferential nature. 
2. The economic strategies of the individual members of an EIA are what determine their 
own particular rules of origin. Hence, such rules will necessarily be different in the different EIAs 
they have signed. Since rules of origin have different effects in the different countries belonging to 
an EIA, given the differences in their production structures and levels of economic development, it 
follows that special and differential treatment should be accorded to the less developed countries. 
3. The NAFTA rules of origin and those applied under the EIAs between LAIA members 
and the European Union were negotiated product by product, which makes them very selective. On 
the other hand, LAIA rules of origin are general in nature, although product-specific rules are also 
allowed. At the same time, NAFTA rules of origin and those applied by EIAs between LAIA 
members and the European Union are more precise and not open to interpretation. Their very 
clarity has helped prevent unnecessary disputes. The LAIA text, which is brief, simple and lenient, 
allows for almost any product to meet the general rule of origin, which therefore can no longer be 
considered discriminating. Moreover, since it is wide open to interpretation, it often gives rise to 
problems that otherwise could have been avoided. 
4. From the standpoint of substance, the NAFTA rules of origin and those applied in the 
EIAs between LAIA members and EU provide an adequate response to the challenges posed by 
globalization; not so with LAIA, which does not seem to have adjusted to the present 
circumstances. It is worth pointing out that the NAFTA rule of origin is especially interesting in 
that it provides for application of the de minimis criterion, of regional accumulation of value and 
includes special procedures relating both to goods and to fungibles. 
Conclusions on the form of the rules of origin considered 
1. There is no reason to think that a thorough and specific rule of origin cannot be also 
simple and clear. In order for such a rule to work well, a sophisticated and efficient negotiating and 
administrative system will be needed. Therefore the rules of origin applied under NAFTA and the 
EIAs between LAIA members and EU require efficient and detailed procedures and mechanisms to 
enforce them. 
2. It appears that all the procedures associated with the rules of origin currently applied in 
the different EIAs, including those falling under LAIA, can be standardized and streamlined and 
electronic signatures can be adopted. This streamlining can be accomplished at every step, from the 
issuance of the certificate of origin up through the oversight and control functions. 
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3. In the case of NAFTA, certificates of origin are issued directly by producers or exporters 
(private law). In the remaining two families of rules considered, final responsibility for the 
certificates always falls on a governmental agency (public law). Solving problems in private law 
prevents political tensions between governments, but there is a greater potential for fraud. 
4. In the case of EIAs under LAIA and EIAs between LAIA members and the European 
Union, issuance of this document is more complicated because the public sector is also involved. 
The fact that the NAFTA certificate of origin for a given product is valid for a whole year also 
facilitates trade and reduces transaction costs. In LAIA and the European Union, the certificate is 
valid for only one commercial transaction. 
5. As regards administrative procedures relating to rules of origin, special bodies have been 
set up in NAFTA and in the EIAs with the European Union. It is easier to anticipate potential 
problems in NAFTA, since its objectives are more clearly spelled out. In the case of economic 
complementation agreements (ECAs) under LAIA, on the other hand, the only such case is that 
pertaining to the overall operation of the EIA, which means that these matters have to be dealt with 
more indirectly, thus slowing down the process. 
6. As regards the settlement of disputes regarding origin, in NAFTA the parties concerned 
can use their own institutions to resolve this type of conflicts, or if previously agreed, have 
recourse to the specialized body in WTO. LAIA, on the other hand, does not have a dispute-
settlement tribunal, so each ECA has to create its own dispute-settlement mechanism. If there were 
a centralized institution for this purpose, that would benefit all the ECAs, since it would be 
possible to eliminate the costs incurred in designing and administrating separate systems. The 
disputes that have arisen in EIAs between LAIA members and the European Union are not settled 
in a specialized tribunal, but rather in an administrative institution, on the basis of good faith. 
Proceedings associated with rules of origin in LAIA and NAFTA are considered to be 
administrative in nature, with NAFTA being the more efficient of the two. In the case of the 
European Union, the focus is on assistance and cooperation, which tends to lower the profile of any 
problems that might arise. 
7. Oversight in connection with certificates of origin in the three families of rules is a 
complex and sometimes slow process. Oversight is undoubtedly more stringent in NAFTA, which 
uses two methods for verifying origin. The first involves the use of questionnaires, which are 
widely used because of their low cost, although they are less efficient than the second method, 
which entails sending inspectors to the exporting country but is not often used because of the high 
costs involved. 
8. Consequently, when there are significant differences in the economic capabilities of 
countries belonging to an EIA, consideration might be given to adopting a system providing for 
equitable distribution of the costs of inspection visits and improvement of the administrative 
capabilities of the less developed partners. This is a vital question, since the NAFTA rules of origin 
call for economic operators, both exporters and importers, to provide complete and transparent 
information, and this does not always happen in the developing countries.  
9. Despite the aforementioned operational weaknesses in NAFTA, which can certainly be 
solved, the NAFTA administrative system is more expeditious than the system applied in the EIAs 
between LAIA members and the European Union. LAIA itself lags behind, taking third place. 
Final comments 
1. In determining how efficient a given set of rules of origin is, it is important to take into 
account not only the content of the rules, but also the formal procedures associated with them, 
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given that the theoretical and the empirical aspects work together to determine their overall 
usefulness. Thus, from the overall standpoint of content and form, the NAFTA rules of origin seem 
to be more efficient that those applied by the European Union. Nevertheless, both systems could 
still be improved. In the case of LAIA, more radical changes might be in order. 
2. It is understandable, therefore, that some EIAs between members of LAIA have dropped 
the LAIA rules of origin. These include the following: Bolivia-Mercosur, Chile-Mercosur, Chile-
Peru and Mercosur itself. The same holds for the G-3 (free trade agreement between Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela) and the current Chile-Mexico EIA, which apply a system that is 
completely different from that of LAIA.  
3. It is not surprising, therefore, that the current Chile-Mexico ECA follow the rules of 
origin applied by NAFTA. Another case worth mentioning is that of the Chile-Mercosur ECA, 
which has adopted, although without much success, some of the controls implemented by NAFTA. 
As it is currently applied, the latter ECA has led to problems that make it necessary to renegotiate 
the rules of origin and related procedures. It should be noted that renegotiation are bound to be 
slow and costly and should be avoided if possible. 
4. Chile and the Republic of Korea recently entered into an EIA which envisages a mixed 
procedure for issuing certificates of origin. Thus, while Chile uses self-certification, in the 
Republic of Korea a public agency is responsible for issuing the certificates. Evidently, 
certification is an issue that has not yet been fully resolved. 
5. The current negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) provide a clear 
indication of the lack of consensus on certain operational issues relating to preferential rules of 
origin. Thus, the United States has proposed a procedure that is different from that of NAFTA; 
under this proposal, certificates of origin would be issued by importers, who are most likely to be 
affected in cases of fraud. The problem with this is that it will be difficult for importers to obtain 
the necessary information from exporters, a situation that can discourage and complicate reciprocal 
preferential trade in goods. Canada, Chile and Mexico have proposed self-certification, while 
Mercosur has proposed yet another system, which is also different from that suggested by the 
Andean Community (CAN). As a result, despite the considerable progress that has been made so 
far, there is still no agreement on rules of origin within FTAA. 
6. It would appear, therefore, that further work must be done on rules of origin, including 
the related operational and administrative aspects; in other words, the focus should be on trade 
facilitation. Not only is this an issue of vital importance for EIAs, but it also has implications for all 
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